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CHAPTER 1
Debt Fever: An Introduction to
High-Cost Consumer Credit
If you advance money to any poor man amongst my people, you shall not
act like a money lender: you must not exact interest from him. If you take
your neighbor’s cloak in pawn, you shall return it to him by sunset, because
it is his only covering. It is the cloak in which he wraps his body; in what else
can he sleep? If he appeals to me, I will listen, for I am full of compassion.
—Exodus 22:25–7
ALEADING AND ACCLAIMED BUSINESS historian said of creditthat, “free market long-term rates of interest for any indus-
trial nation, properly charted, provide a sort of fever chart of the
economic and political health of that nation.”1 In general, main-
stream America has enjoyed historically low interest rates for over
a decade, suggesting a robust economy and a responsive democ-
racy. Our consumer credit system facilitates access to shelter,
transportation, education, and many other goods and services
both necessary and desirable in modern life. A family home
bought over time with an inexpensive fixed-rate mortgage is a
mainstay of the American dream, creating stability in extended
families, neighborhoods, and entire communities. In financing a
1
car, a worker can exchange a financial obligation for the priceless
freedom to travel where and when she chooses. Borrowing in order
to finance an education is an irreproachable investment in one’s
future. For these reasons and others we should all be proud that af-
fordable credit is available to so many Americans.
Nevertheless, we must also remember that nations are made of
groups within groups and ultimately of individuals. To say a nation
has an interest rate fever is only to make a generalized claim about
particular people, each with names and stories, and each of whom
more or less contributes to the truth of the statement. A nation in-
fected with a fever is so called because many people pay high prices
for the use of money, people like Leticia Ortega, a computer store
cashier in San Antonio, Texas. Short on cash, Ortega was facing
termination of her past due telephone and electrical utilities. With
her next paycheck still two weeks away, she saw an advertisement
for a short-term loan in the Thrifty Nickel, a weekly local classified
listing newsletter. The advertiser, National Money Service, Inc.,
offered a two-week $300 loan for a charge of $90. Despairing for
some other solution to her shortfall, Ortega borrowed the money.
But after two weeks had passed she was no closer to financial sol-
vency than before. Unable to pay the entire $390 due, National
Money Service “rolled over” the loan by withdrawing $90 directly
from Ortega’s checking account. Because Ortega was living pay-
check to paycheck, with no surplus income available to retire the
$300 debt, she continued to pay the $90 every two weeks for nearly
a year. Eventually she paid $1,800—a substantial portion of her
yearly income—but still owed all of the original debt. The annual
interest rate of Ortega’s loan was just under a feverish 800 percent.2
Even “healthy” nations have always had individuals who pay
feverish prices for the use of money. The governments, corpora-
tions, banks, and wealthy individuals of our society have in general
successfully immunized themselves from high interest rates through
sound monetary policy, well-considered government regulation,
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and, most importantly, by harnessing competitive market forces.
But for America’s working class, and for America’s increasingly vul-
nerable lower-middle-class, the analogy between health and credit
prices begins to suggest a different medical chart. This book argues
the high-cost consumer credit often extended to this group is best
seen as a persistent low grade infection, sometimes more and some-
times less noticed by elites, but always burning the vulnerable.
Americans in all demographic categories are borrowing more
relative to their disposable income than ever before. In fact, for
the first time in American history, our collective debts have ex-
ceeded our collective disposable income. As Table 1.1 shows, debt
burden as a percentage of disposable income has grown steadily
throughout the latter twentieth century. From a modest 31.9 per-
cent of disposable personal income in 1949, outstanding debt grew
to 71.9 percent by 1979. By the mid-1990s debt represented 91.9
percent of personal disposable income. And, despite rapid growth
in stocks and productivity in the latter 1990s, by the turn of the
century Americans had more debt than disposable income. Thus,
as the Economic Policy Institute explained, “[a]t the aggregate
level, debt is a more important feature of the household economy
than at any time in modern history.”3
TABLE 1.1
Aggregate household debt as a percentage of personal disposable
income, 1949–99
1949 1967 1973 1979 1989 1995 1999
31.9% 66.9% 65.2% 71.9% 84.6% 91.9% 103.0%
Source: Economic Policy Institute, The State of Working America 2000/20014
For most Americans this increasing debt has been benign. The
purchased use of money—credit—is a valuable commodity for na-
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tions, corporations, and households alike. As one scholar has ex-
plained, “consumer credit is about much more than instant grati-
fication. It is also about discipline, hard work, and the channeling
of one’s productivity toward durable consumer goods.”5 For afflu-
ent Americans it is safe to say the increasing debt load of the past
two decades may be ascribed to comparatively well-considered ob-
ligations purchased at tolerably low interest rates for mostly good
reasons. Moreover, the stock market boom and dramatically rising
productivity of American workers in the 1990s was kind to Amer-
ica’s more affluent citizens, offsetting the impact of rising debts.
Despite the burst technology bubble and currently slower growth,
for the relatively affluent middle class on up, America has a strong
economy and bright prospects.
But for less well-off Americans, the ever-rising proportion of
disposable income dedicated to outstanding debt hints at a darker
future. At the end of the twentieth century a new and distressing
trend of spreading financial infection has emerged—an interest
rate fever for which a growing number of working-class and lower-
middle-class Americans have scant resistance. With approxi-
mately 90 percent of all stocks and bonds owned by the wealthiest
10 percent of American society, the stock market boom of the
1990s scarcely benefitted our most vulnerable groups.6 According
to the most recently published federal survey of consumer fi-
nances, approximately 12.6 percent of all American families have
annual incomes of $10,000 or less. Of these families—including
families with household heads at ages close to or in retirement—
less than two percent have invested in mutual funds, less than four
percent own any stocks at all, and no statistically significant num-
ber own bonds.7 Table 1.2 explains that while vulnerable families’
assets grew, their debts grew faster. The result was that the least
wealthy 40 percent of American households saw a dramatic de-
cline in their net worth despite the growing economy. Thus, as
one scholarly work puts it, “the real story of the 1990s was not the
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stock market boom, but the debt explosion.”8 Or, in the more re-
strained—and portentous—words of Federal Reserve Board Chair-
man Alan Greenspan, “families with low-to-moderate incomes
and minorities did not appear to fully benefit from the highly fa-
vorable economic developments of the mid-1990s.”9
TABLE 1.2
Average assets and liabilities of the least wealthy 40 percent of
American households (constant 1998 dollars)
Stocks* All other assets Total debt Net worth
1983 $ 400 $16,800 $12,500 $4,700
1992 800 19,100 17,600 2,300
1995 1,100 20,600 20,700 1,000
1998 1,700 23,800 24,400 1,100
*All direct and indirect stock holdings
Source: Economic Policy Institute Analysis of Survey of Consumer Finance Data
At the same time net worth has declined, low to moderate in-
come Americans have also experienced stagnation or a decline in
the real value of their wages. Between 1973 and 1999, the median
weekly wage in the United States fell 12 percent from $502 to $442.
Although the real value of median weekly wages recovered slightly
in the mid- to late 1990s, it still has not recovered to its 1988 level.
In the words of Federal Reserve Board researchers,” mean incomes
for all education groups in 1998 were lower than they had been in
1989.” For families headed by a worker with no high school degree,
real income declined even in the rapid growth years between 1995
and 1998.10
Unsurprisingly, key indicators of financial instability have in-
creased in proportion to declining real wages and net worth. For
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instance, the 1990s saw significant increases in the number of
households with debt service payments equal to more than 40 per-
cent of household income—an important indicator of financial
hardship caused by over-indebtedness. Perhaps more ominous is a
startling increase in the number of lower-middle-income families
who were late in paying bills over the past decade. Of families with
annual incomes between $25,000 and $49,999, in 1989 only 4.8
percent were late sixty days or more in paying at least one bill. By
1998 this figure nearly doubled to close to one family in ten.11
While working poor families saw increased debt load and decreased
earning power, their access to traditional banking services has also de-
creased. Prefacing a major market shift in the financial servicing of
America’s working poor, the number of families without a bank ac-
count increased by 77 percent between 1977 and 1989.12 Many of the
key pressures keeping working poor families out of banks and savings
associations remained, and perhaps increased, in the 1990s growth
economy. A Federal Reserve Board report shows that while most
banking fees paid by solvent customers remained static, those fees
commonly charged to consumers in financial trouble grew dramati-
cally in the late 1990s. Stop payment orders, overdraft charges, not
sufficient funds fees, and below minimum balance fees—all acutely
felt by families experiencing income shocks—grew much faster than
inflation in the last decade. For instance, bank and savings association
overdraft charges grew 17 and 23 percent respectively between 1994
and 1999 alone. Not sufficient funds check fees and stop payment
order prices both rose about 15 percent in this five year period. And
bank fees charged to customers whose savings account balances
dipped below minimum requirements grew by a surprising 31.3 per-
cent.13 At the turn of the century, the best estimates suggest 13 to 15
percent of all American families are “unbanked”—“nearly double the
proportion in England.”14 Of families without checking accounts, 86.2
percent had annual incomes less than $25,000 and 44.7 percent had
annual incomes less than $10,000. About 57 percent of these families
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were non-white or Hispanic. Currently, over 20 million Americans
have no access to mainstream banking services.15
Observing these trends, many have begun to ask this question:
If working poor and lower-middle-class families have, over the
past two decades, borrowed more, but banked with traditional
first-tier lenders less, with whom are they doing business? A short
survey of recent headlines begins to answer this question:
• “Short-term Loan Firms Prospering: Critics Say High Interest
Rates, Easy Terms Have Led to Exploitation of Working Poor”
• “Easy Money: Subprime Lenders Make a Killing Catering to
Poorer Americans. Now Wall Street Is Getting in on the Act”
• “Payday Lenders Face Fiery Criticism: Consumer Advocates
Say Federal Law Allows Institutions to Operate Like Loan
Sharks”
• “Time to Restore Loansharking Laws”
• “Borrowing Trouble: How Can Legislators Not Be Offended
By Payday-Advance Business that Charge Outrageous Fees to
Cash Strapped Consumers?”
• “How High Can the Finance Companies Go? With Interest
Rates, the Sky Is the Limit”
• “Banking on a Costly Alternative: Low Earners Turn to Check
Cashing Stores”
• “Wolf At the Door: Vulnerable Need Protection Against
Predatory Lenders”
• “Shark Attacks: An Encounter with Predatory Lenders Can
Leave You Without Your Money—Or Your Home”
• “Feeding Off the Bottom”
• “Little Loans Come at Staggering Cost”
• “New Lenders with Huge Fees Thrive on Workers With Debts”
• “It Was Illegal When It Was Loansharking”16
Unfortunately, hard data on financial service providers that cater
to the working poor is notoriously sparse.17 Nevertheless, upon ex-
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amining the growth and business practices, as well as the stories asso-
ciated with many second-tier lenders, the answer becomes clear.
Working poor families have turned to a looseknit patchwork of busi-
nesses, including small moneylending firms, multinational consumer
credit corporations, high-rate credit card issuers, mortgage loan com-
panies, payday loan/check-cashing outlets, automobile title loan
companies, rent-to-own furnishing stores, and pawnshops, to serve
their financial needs. Although this industry has a wide variety of
practices, norms, and agendas, the one unifying characteristic pos-
sessed by all is that they sell credit at relatively high cost.
WHAT IS HIGH-COST CREDIT?
The personal finance industry catering to high-risk, low-income
borrowers defies easy description. A variety of names are associ-
ated with this industry including alternative finance lenders, sub-
prime lenders, specialty lenders, small loan lenders, fringe bankers,
predatory lenders, and sometimes loansharks. In the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries the word “usury” contextually linked the
group together—given widespread interest-rate caps which drew a
rough line between socially acceptable and unacceptable credit.
Originally the word “usury” came from the Latin noun usura
which referred to the “use” of anything; “hence, usury was the
price paid for the use of money.”18 But as moderately priced con-
sumer credit sold to the middle class became entrenched in the
twentieth century, the legal as well as cultural lines distinguishing
usurious credit eroded. For some “usury” refers to an unfair loan.
Others use the word to describe an illegal loan without hinting at
any concurrent moral condemnation. The word can also refer to
the body of law regulating the amount of interest charged. It may
also refer to a particular statutory limitation in a particular juris-
diction. Sometimes usury refers not to an entire loan, but only to
the amount of interest that exceeds the legal rate. Courts have dis-
agreed whether non-interest charges are included for purposes of
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calculating usury law violations. Often it is not clear from the con-
text which meaning the authors intend. At the beginning of the
twenty-first century the word “usury” has become something of an
inconveniently ambiguous anachronism.
A more useful reference increasingly used in both federal and
state law is the simple description “high cost.”19 The essential dif-
ference between mainstream creditors and “alternative finance
lenders” is relatively expensive prices. Moreover, “high cost,” un-
like usury, is a fluid enough concept to readily include both in-
terest and non-interest charges, such as origination fees,
brokerage fees, processing fees, application fees, credit insurance
premiums, appraisal fees, refinancing charges, late payment
penalties, early payment penalties, and dozens of other creditor
inventions which tend to obscure the true cost of a loan. Ad-
mittedly, at what point credit should be considered high cost is
open to debate. Some would say all consumer credit has high
costs, in comparison to commercial loans, while others would
argue no loan has a high cost if the borrower willingly agrees to
it. We can save this argument for another day. For the purposes
of this book, it is not necessary to discuss at length at what par-
ticular point a loan should be considered “high cost.” Certainly,
an 800 percent annual percentage rate (“APR”) “payday” loan
qualifies. A 6.7 percent APR thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage
with low points and fair contractual terms does not. Whether a
29 percent APR revolving credit card contract qualifies as high
cost is an open question. For our purposes, the term is one of
convenience aimed at describing the upper end of consumer
credit usually extended to the poor and those with risky credit
records. Nevertheless, a more detailed picture of high-cost credit
can come from examining a selection of some prominent high-
cost credit arrangements and lenders.
Debt Fever: An Introduction to High-Cost Consumer Debt 9
“Only Until Payday”—Deferred Deposit Lenders
Perhaps the archetypal high-cost creditor is the payday lender.
While the industry prefers the term “deferred deposit lender,”
companies within the industry are also known as check cashers,
check lenders, deferred presentment lenders, post-dated check
lenders, sale-lease-back companies, and payday advance compa-
nies. Payday lenders trace their American origins to the “five for
six” salary lenders prevalent at the end of the nineteenth century.
Customers of these early salary lenders would often borrow five
dollars on Monday and in exchange pay six dollars on Friday or
Saturday. Contrary to popular Hollywood imagery of extortionate
mafia lenders, the term “loanshark” actually evolved in large East-
ern cities some time after the Civil War to describe specifically
these early salary lenders.20 The term did not come to describe the
mafia until at least the 1930s. Today’s payday lenders provide
nearly identical loans as our first loansharks, only now lenders
have the added security of holding the debtor’s personal check.
In a typical contemporary transaction, a customer might borrow
$100 by writing a check made out to the creditor for $117.50. The
date written on the check reflects the due date of the loan. Typi-
cally, a loan is for two weeks. Thus, two weeks after obtaining the
post-dated check, the creditor will collect by depositing the check.
Lenders verify the debtor’s identity by asking for documents or
identification such as a drivers license, recent pay stubs, bank
statements, car registration, or telephone bills. Most lenders will
telephone the borrower’s human resource manager or boss to ver-
ify employment. Virtually all lenders require the names, addresses,
and telephone numbers of close family and friends in the event the
borrower skips town. Payday lenders decide whether to issue a loan
on the spot without obtaining a credit report. Both parties are
aware the checking account does not have sufficient funds to
cover the check when it is signed. After the paperwork is com-
plete, the debtor walks away with $100 in cash or a check drawn
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on the lender’s account. When the two weeks are up, the debtor
can redeem the check with cash or a money order, permit the
check to be deposited, or attempt to renew the loan by paying an-
other fee. If the borrower cannot pay off the loan, the obligation
continues to accrue $17.50 in interest every two weeks. Although
the initial $17.50 fee represents only 17.5 percent of the loan
amount, the annual percentage rate of the transaction is around
456 percent.21 In comparison, the average reported interest rates of
mafia lenders in New York City during the 1960s was a relatively
inexpensive 250 percent.22
Surprising to some, a 456 percent APR loan is not unusual. Be-
cause the federal government does not collect data on payday
lender interest rates, there are no firm nationwide statistics show-
ing payday loan prices. However, studies by state agencies, con-
sumer advocates, and academics regularly suggest average payday
loan annual percentage rates are roughly between 391 and 550
percent. In the quick cash, no credit check, easy money, storefront
credit shops that line America’s strip malls, loans with quadruple-
digit annual percentage rates are common. For example, while an
Indiana Department of Financial Institutions survey found the av-
erage Indiana payday loan interest rate was 498.75 percent, one
company offered a $100 loan at a $20 charge per day—a stagger-
ing 7,300 percent APR loan. North Carolina consumers purchase
about 63 percent of their payday loans at annual interest rates be-
tween 406.08 percent and 805.15 percent. Payday lenders in Salt
Lake City charge an average rate of 528.49 percent. A consumer
advocate coalition study surveying lenders in nineteen states and
the District of Columbia found an average payday loan interest
rate of 474 percent.23
Moreover, these calculations of average interest rates severely
underestimate the true prices of payday loans. Payday creditors
typically charge other unexpected fees in the course of a normal
loan. For example, insufficient funds fees applied to normal
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bounced checks also apply to payday loan checks. Usually both
the payday lender as well as the debtor’s bank or credit union will
charge the debtor separate fees for bouncing a loan check. Some
lenders will require debtors to give two separate checks for one
loan so when the debtor defaults, the lender can collect two in-
sufficient funds fees. These insufficient funds fees can be as ex-
pensive as the interest on any given payday loan. Some creditors
will charge an insufficient funds fee every time they attempt to de-
posit the original loan check, usually once every two weeks. For
example, if a lender charges a $25 insufficient funds fee on a $100
loan carried for a typical six months, the contract will oblige the
debtor to pay an additional $300 above and beyond the disclosed
interest rate.
However, insufficient funds fees are hardly the only culprit.
Hidden fees are limited only by the lender’s imagination. For ex-
ample, Check City, a Utah payday lender, includes in its boiler-
plate contract a $75 per hour “collection fee” for time expended
collecting a loan. The contract is silent on how much time the
creditor may take. And, to help ensure the lender can pocket this
independent fee, the contract states, “I authorize Check City .l.l.l,
at any time on or after the due date of my loan or payroll advance,
to initiate a charge to any checking account of mine, by electronic
funds transfer or otherwise, for the unpaid amount of my loan, in-
cluding interest, all costs and expenses of collection (including
attorneys fees) and late and returned check charges.”24
Many states have usury laws limiting interest to around 36 per-
cent annually. In these states the payday lending business is con-
ducted by evading interest-rate caps. Such evasion is easier and
more common than it sounds. Currently, one common loophole
involves “charter renting.” Payday lenders interpret federal bank-
ing law to exempt nationally chartered banks from state interest-
rate caps. Payday loan companies form relationships with federal
banks where the payday lender solicits, manages, and issues each
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loan, but ostensibly uses the federal bank’s funds in exchange for a
per-loan fee. The result is that payday lenders often operate with
impunity even in states where popularly elected legislatures have
passed outright bans on payday lending.25 For example, the New
York state legislature has limited interest rates to no more than 25
percent annually. Still, payday lenders linked to out-of-state banks
have attempted to offer payday loans within the state. A cha-
grined New York Banking Department superintendent recently
complained “banks that choose to offer this type of loan product
at exorbitant interest rates are blatantly abusing [federal] author-
ity. These types of actions, when judged in the court of public
opinion, can lead to a groundswell of outrage resulting in reputa-
tional harm and safety and soundness problems.”26 But despite this
and similar complaints around the country, payday lenders at-
tached to even the most insignificant of federal banks remain free
to charge whatever interest rates they choose.
Payday lenders defend their products by pointing out their loans
are intended only to help consumers deal with short-term cash
shortfalls. They argue it is not fair to quote annual percentage
rates for loans which only last for one or two weeks. However,
what empirical data is available shows payday loans are often in re-
ality medium- or long-term obligations. For example, North Car-
olina regulators counted the total number of payday loan
transactions of given customers at a given company in a year.
About 87 percent of borrowers would roll over any given loan at
least one time with any given lender. Not counting debtors who
borrowed from multiple locations, 38.3 percent of customers re-
newed their payday loans more than ten times. About 14 percent
of borrowers renewed their payday loans with the same lender
more than nineteen times per year. Illinois regulators found pay-
day loan customers “who were borrowing continuously for over a
year on their original loan.” Indiana also found approximately 77
percent of payday loans are rollovers of existing loans. Consumer
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advocates have found the average customer borrows 10.19 payday
loans per year, with some debtors borrowing many more times. In
fact, one debtor renewed 66 times in order to pay off a single pay-
day loan—approximately a two-and-one-half year debt—assuming
a typical two-week renewal cycle. Even an industry-funded study
found about 40 percent of payday loan borrowers rolled over more
than five loans in the preceding twelve months, including about
20 percent of all borrowers who renewed existing loans nine times
or more.27
Trouble comes for many debtors after they borrow and they re-
alize how difficult repayment can be on a limited income and pay-
check-to-paycheck standard of living. A government study
indicates “the average customer is usually a woman in her middle
thirties earning just over $24,000 a year. She usually rents her
home and once she becomes a customer of a short-term loan com-
pany she usually remains a customer for at least six months.”28 Sim-
ilarly, an informal Florida survey found the typical payday debtor
is a twenty-eight-year-old white female who earns between
$14,500 and $20,000 per year working in the service or health care
industries.29 For such debtors, payday loans may become a trap
they cannot escape without missing rent, utilities, car payments,
or food expenditures. These loans can create a biweekly cycle of
income and expenses leaving only enough surplus income to pay
the most recent accrual in interest and fees. In the words of the
Illinois Department of Financial Institutions:
Industry members who have testified at .l.l. public Illinois
Senate hearings have referred to their customers as average
citizens who encounter unexpected financial hardships.
What they have failed to mention was that the financial
strains placed on consumers were rarely short-lived. Cus-
tomers playing catch-up with their expenses do not have the
ability to overcome unexpected financial hardships because
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their budgets are usually limited. The high expenses of a
short term loan depletes the customer’s ability to catch-up,
therefore making the customer “captive” to the lender.30
A leading consumer advocate report goes one step farther saying,
“[t]hese loans are designed to keep consumers in perpetual debt.”31
While industry representatives dispute such claims, Janet De-
laney from Alabama might not. She is employed as a hospital
food-service worker, making around $16,000 a year. When she
needed $200 to cover impending bills she turned to a local payday
lender. The business loaned Delaney her shortfall for a $38 fee.
But when her next payday rolled around, she still didn’t have
enough money to cover the check. Instead she rolled over her loan
for an additional $38. A University of Alabama law student who
eventually highlighted Delaney’s plight explained, “[a] year later,
she had paid $1,220 in fees and still owed $200. Over a twelve-
month period, Ms. Delaney paid 610 percent interest, returning to
the payday lender thirty-two times and borrowing from two other
payday lenders just to make the fee payments.”32
Many states have responded by passing laws which prohibit
lenders from “rolling over” payday loans. State legislators hope
these laws will prevent the abuses associated with long-term pay-
day loan debt. However, these restrictions have proven even eas-
ier to evade than traditional interest-rate caps. Despite a Utah rule
prohibiting rollovers beyond twelve weeks, the author of one study
recorded a “refreshingly candid” conversation with a young female
cashier at a Salt Lake City check lender. “Brandy” explained “[w]e
have them paying for sometimes two or three years.l.l.l. They just
have to keep on paying. They will, like, pay for the loan two or
three times and still owe the loan.”33 Rollover prohibitions are dif-
ficult to enforce, because lenders can structure the transaction to
allow the debtor to pay off the old loan with proceeds from a “new
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loan.”34 Also, nothing prevents debtors from taking out another
payday loan at a different location.
In addition to high prices on longer term payday loans, many
have observed a systemic pattern of questionable business prac-
tices and state law violations in the payday lending industry. For
example, in 718 payday lender inspections conducted over a
three-year period, North Carolina Banking officials found 8,911
violations of simple state consumer-protection rules.35 Moreover,
many commentators have complained payday lenders manipulate
the criminal justice system to help collect debts. Ambiguous fraud-
ulent check laws and theft statutes in many states allow payday
lenders to threaten criminal prosecution for writing “bad” checks.
Payday lenders in Ohio, for example, sue under the “Civil
Damages for Crime Victim” statute .l.l. which provides triple
damages to victims of theft offenses, including bad checks. In-
spection of court records in DaytonMunicipal Courts Division
over eight months in 1999 found 381 actions by five payday
lenders. Defaulting customers were charged triple damages, 10
percent interest on the damages, and court costs. The total
dollar amount for the judgments from all 381 cases was
$285,406. In 60 percent of the cases, wages were garnished.36
Similarly, a Texas regulator testified that in only one year, payday
lenders filed 13,000 criminal charges against their customers in
one Dallas precinct. Of course, payday lenders know perfectly well
debtors are signing checks which cannot clear when written—a
cash shortage is the whole premise of payday loans. But even in
states which prohibit criminal justice action, a hollow threat of
prosecution by a county attorney can provide enough leverage and
fear to accomplish the same objective. It goes without saying tra-
ditional creditors such as banks, credit unions, and savings and
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loan associations, unlike payday lenders, cannot use the criminal
justice system to collect their bad debts.37
Fueled by these and other remarkably profitable trade practices,
the payday lending industry has exploded. Although the business
of selling short-term credit at high prices has an old pedigree, the
relatively young version of securing debt with personal checks has
grown exponentially in the past two decades. In North Carolina,
payday lending outlets roughly quadrupled in four years, growing
from 307 in 1997 to 1,204 in 2000. Payday lending outlets quin-
tupled in Salt Lake City between 1994 and 2000. Wyoming pay-
day lenders tripled between 1996 and 1997. Iowa’s payday lenders
increased from eight to sixty-four in two years. Colorado officials
have estimated payday lenders have grown to make up 20 percent
of that state’s licensed lenders. One Wisconsin consumer advocate
observes, “[t]he payday lenders are moving in by the day here.l.l.l.
We’re watching it happen.”38 An explanation for this growth is not
difficult to find. By one estimate in the late 1980s, opening a pay-
day lending outlet required an initial investment as small as
$65,000 and could create before-tax returns of $117,000 in a single
year.39 The Tennessee Department of Financial Institutions “reported
to its state legislature that licensed payday lenders earned over 30
percent return on investment in the first nine months of legal oper-
ation.”40 One economics professor estimates check cashing/
lending operations earn ten to twenty times higher return on eq-
uity than traditional banks.41 Summarizing this trend, John D.
Hawke, U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, recently pointed out
“there are now more payday loan offices in California than Mc-
Donald’s and Burger King restaurants.”42
Neither does this astounding growth appear to be slackening
off. A recent trade association convention drew standing-room-
only crowds for those interested in converting other businesses
into payday loan outlets. This continuing growth will inevitably
affect our culture and change the assumptions we hold about fi-
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nancial services. For example, in Louisiana, a company called Mr.
Payroll has teamed up with Circle K convenience stores to sell
payday check loans alongside fountain drinks, gasoline, and
Twinkies. Not to be outdone, Utah regulators have issued a pay-
day loan license to Atlantis Burger, allowing debtors to purchase
triple-digit-interest-rate loans while stopping off for a hamburger.
Some predict payday loans will soon be offered through ATM ter-
minals. Finally, the Illinois Department of Financial Institutions
warns the payday loan market may grow an additional 600 percent
in the coming decade.43
The Venerable “Hock Shop”
Pawnbrokers are the veterans in the high-cost credit market.
For a variety of reasons, some not related to credit, pawnbrokers
have faced a continuing struggle to improve their public image
dating back thousands of years.44 First, fairly or not, pawnbrokers
are associated with stolen goods. Many jurisdictions require iden-
tification and thumbprinting of pawnshop customers to discourage
resale of stolen property. Similarly, pawnshop gun sales, sometimes
in questionable compliance with federal gun control laws, do not
help reputation-building efforts.45 Pawnshops have also often been
associated with gambling, as well as adult bookstores, strip clubs,
and liquor stores. Pawnbrokers in close proximity to casinos tend
to do brisk and steady business by financing gambling binges and
reselling pawned merchandise to winners. One Massachusetts
pawnbroker describes regularly taking out ads saying “Lose to the
bookies? Come see us!”46 A surprisingly common municipal squab-
ble involves local planning commissions or city councils harassing
pawnbrokers with restrictive zoning ordinances.47
But most important of all, critics accuse pawnbrokers of using
credit to profit from the misfortunes of the impoverished. Usually
consumers seeking pawn credit are highly cash-constrained. A re-
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cent survey indicated 69 percent of pawnshop customers had been
more than 60 days late in paying some bills during the previous
year. 70 percent had been contacted by a debt collection agency.
And “16 percent had their wages garnished within the previous
two to three years for a purpose other than child support,” accord-
ing to one researcher.48 One pawnbroker, owner of the Happy
Hocker in Cleveland, Ohio, estimates that at least 80 percent of
his customers do not have bank accounts.49 Almost all pawn
debtors lack the credit history and real property security to obtain
cheaper credit from banks or credit unions. In the words of the
CEO and founder of Cash America, Inc., the nation’s largest
pawnshop chain, “I could take my customers and put them on a
bus and drive them down to a bank and the bank would laugh at
them. That’s why they’re my customers.”50
Although some pawnshop customers only shop at pawnshops
for negotiable prices on second-hand consumer goods, loaning
money is the backbone of most pawn operations. Typical pawn
loans are very simple transactions where the creditor provides a
fixed-term loan to a customer who leaves a personal item in the
possession of the lender as collateral. After the customer repays all
the required interest and fees, the lender will return the security to
the borrower. The majority of customers return and reclaim their
goods. Veteran pawnbrokers estimate 45 out of 50 borrowers will
eventually succeed in redeeming their security. A leading scholar
on pawn credit comparably estimates 10 to 30 percent of borrow-
ers default on their pawn loans. Pawnbrokers’ interest rates vary
with the regulations of different states and localities. In states with
unregulated markets, pawnshop interest rates average around 240
percent APR. But in states with active interest-rate regulation,
such as Oregon, charges can reach as low as 40 percent annually.
Nevertheless, in Texas, which boasts more pawnshops than any
other state and also regulates pawn charges, the average annual
rate is around 200 percent. Although no national data is available,
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Cash America, with 420 shops in eighteen states around the coun-
try, extends pawn credit at an estimated aggregate average annual
interest rate of 205.3 percent.51
One positive feature of pawn credit is its tendency to be natu-
rally short-term and terminal. Unlike payday loans where con-
sumers often are forced to repay their loans over relatively long
periods, a defaulting pawn debtor simply forfeits the personal item
left with the pawnbroker as collateral. On the other hand, pawn
customers do not have access to the goods which secure their loans.
When a customer pawns a television set or diamond ring this may
not be serious. However, the most secure loans are those where the
customer cannot get by without the collateral. “I’ve seen people
take their dentures out of their mouths before,” explains Steve An-
derson, manager of ACME Pawn in Colorado Springs, Colorado.
“One guy took his gold tooth out of his mouth and we took that.”52
Often the only items a working-class family owns which will ob-
tain the necessary credit are tools. This can leave carpenters, auto
mechanics, and other self-employed and journeymen workers with-
out the means to conduct their trades. For instance, the Wichita,
Kansas economy relies heavily on manufacturing of airplane parts.
When the market for air travel dried up following the September
11, 2001 World Trade Center and Pentagon terrorist attacks, local
pawnbrokers reported an “onslaught” of machinist tools from laid
off aerospace workers.53 Unfortunately, many workers have difficulty
finding employment again since they must pay back their loan, plus
a stiff premium, before reclaiming their tools. Undoubtably, this
phenomenon is nothing new and has caused untold misery for thou-
sands of years. Thus, the biblical injunction in Exodus exhorting, “if
you take your neighbor’s cloak in pawn, you shall return it to him by
sunset, because it is his only covering. It is the cloak in which he
wraps his body; in what else can he sleep?” While few contemporary
Americans pawn clothing, the profit motive which spawned the an-
cient dictum is not lost on Wall Street. In the twenty days follow-
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ing the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks the Dow Jones Indus-
trial Average lost 8 percent, the NASDAQ lost 12 percent, but
Cash America saw the price of its publically traded stock jump 8
percent in the opposite direction as traders clamored for opportuni-
ties to weather the impending downturn. A headline on one daily
business newspaper offered the financial advice: “Get Into the
Pawnbrokers for Hard Times Ahead.”54
Although the bursting of the American technology bubble un-
doubtably gave pawnbrokers a shot in the arm, the industry has
been growing steadily for the past twenty years. Low-to-moderate
income consumers have lost access to banks and credit unions since
the late seventies, so they have naturally moved to pawnshops for
their financial needs. Moreover, pawnbrokers themselves explain
widespread overextension of lower-middle-class debtors has forced
increasing numbers to turn to a formerly unthinkable source of
credit to overcome income shocks and unexpected expenses. “Our
business is at an all-time high,” explains Tony Mills, owner of Big
Time Pawn in Tulsa, Oklahoma. “There are a lot of people in seri-
ous debt .l.l. and then, if they lose their jobs .l.l. they are bringing in
things to get quick cash.” In the 1980s alone, the number of pawn-
shops nationwide more than doubled. Although the greatest number
of pawnshops per capita are in the southern and mountain states,
some northeastern and far west states have experienced dramatic
pawnshop growth as well. For example, Pennsylvania saw a 130 per-
cent increase in pawnshop licenses between 1980 and 1991. While
pawnshops grew slightly less quickly in the 1990s than in the 1980s,
the explanation given by most pawnbrokers is not particularly
heartening—competition from payday lenders.55
Rent-to-Own Resurgent
Another important player in the high-cost consumer credit mar-
ket issues credit akin to pawn loans. Rent-to-own lenders lease ap-
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pliances, furniture, electronic equipment, and occasionally jewelry
for weekly payments. If a customer successfully makes payments for
a specified duration of time, the rent-to-own store transfers owner-
ship of the item to its customer. Rent-to-own contracts vary from
around fifty to one hundred and fifty weeks with seventy-eight
weeks being the norm. More expensive items usually rent for longer
periods. Typically, customers can return an item at any time, ending
the arrangement. Rent-to-own purchase prices are usually two or
three times the retail value of the good. Moreover, because a signif-
icant portion of rent-to-own merchandise has been used previously
and then repossessed, the actual depreciated value of the items is
much less than normal retail value. Contracts also typically provide
for a number of ancillary charges such as late payment fees, rental
contract reinstatement fees, and rental property retrieval fees. Rent-
to-own firms also sell renter’s insurance plans which prevent the
firm from suing the customer if an item is lost or stolen. But, unlike
normal insurance, the lost item is not replaced. A “vast majority” of
customers sign up for these protection plans. About 95 percent of
customers borrowing from Rent-A-Center, which in 1993 con-
trolled 25 percent of the 2.3 billion dollar U.S. market, purchased
such insurance, generating 29 million dollars of revenue.56
The industry vociferously maintains rent-to-own contracts are
not loans. In support of this notion, the industry has consistently
claimed only 25 to 30 percent of transactions result in purchases.
However, according to the most comprehensive study available,
conducted by the Federal Trade Commission, about 67 percent of
rent-to-own customers intend to purchase the merchandise, 8 per-
cent were unsure of their intentions, and only 25 percent intend
to rent items for a short while and then return them. Moreover,
FTC data indicates rent-to-own transactions more closely resem-
ble loans than leases since “70 percent of rent-to-own merchan-
dise was purchased by the customer.” Thus, while rent-to-own
dealers describe the transaction as a traditional lease with a bonus
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of ownership provided as an incentive to renew, in reality the
transaction is more like a chattel-secured installment loan with
high interest and foreclosure rates.57
Nevertheless, the rent-to-own industry has aggressively lobbied
state legislatures around the country to avoid regulation under con-
sumer credit laws. In the past fifteen years, forty-six states have
passed industry supported legislation treating rent-to-own transac-
tions as leases over the objections of consumer advocates. The in-
dustry has also pressured Congress for separate lenient treatment.
Hiring some of the nation’s most expensive lobbyists, the rent-to-
own industry hopes to wipe out state laws by passing a relatively
weak federal bill posing as consumer protection. Even in a Congress
focused on alleviating an impending recession following the Sep-
tember 11 terrorist attacks, rent-to-own lobbyists were still hard at
work trying to pass legislation to preempt laws in New Jersey, Min-
nesota, Wisconsin, and Vermont, which still treat rent-to-own busi-
ness as a credit transaction.58 Rent-to-own stores have a strong social
incentive to avoid characterizing their contracts as loans since, when
viewed as credit, rent-to-own contracts are typically one- to three-
year loans with annual interest rates ranging between 70 percent and
360 percent. Most commentators estimate the national average rent-
to-own APR is somewhere around 100 percent.59
The rent-to-own industry commonly practices aggressive and
direct marketing tactics. The comments of Gerald Defiore, a for-
mer store manager from Spartanburg, South Carolina provides in-
sight on one of many marketing tactics:
You would brochure the projects one week before the [wel-
fare] checks came out so you already had that seed planted in
their mind.l.l.l.lThen the day the checks came out, you’d go
back and knock on doors and fill out the work forms there.
Corporate was in on it, the stores were in on it. These people
didn’t stand a chance.60
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Comparably, the Rent-A-Center headquarters in Wichita, Kansas
uses the six references required to open a rent-to-own agreement
for marketing purposes. Individual stores only contact two of the
references in determining whether to rent to the customer, using
the other four references as marketing contacts to send mailings
to. Thus, entire extended families are targeted by advertisements
with opening lines like, “Wouldn’t you rather watch a big screen
TV than the one you have now?”61
Rent-to-own stores usually emphasize courteous treatment of
prospective customers. One industry CEO said that the rent-to-
own industry “treats them [customers] like kings and queens.” Em-
ployees of one firm “are required to greet customers, preferably by
name, within ten seconds of their entrance and to conduct pay-
ment disputes out of earshot of other renters. Stores are also en-
couraged to keep fresh coffee brewing.”62 However, rent-to-own
contracts require substantial collection efforts. Stores will gener-
ally contact renters/borrowers a day or two after a missed payment.
Personal visits to the homes of debtors are standard practice after
as few as three days of arrears. Stores generally repossess items after
a week of delay. The collection process has traditionally been vul-
nerable to abuse and misbehavior. A small but significant percent
of rent-to-own repossessions are completed by breaking in to the
customers’ homes. The contracts of one leading rent-to-own com-
pany includes a boilerplate provision which attempts to sanction
entry into the customer’s residence even when the customer is not
home. The Federal Trade Commission estimates about 7,000 of
these break-in repossessions occur each year. One Nebraska rent-
to-own customer mistakenly shot and killed a repossession agent,
believing the man was a burglar.63 “Employees handling reposses-
sions have been known to bring along members of a feared motor-
cycle gang as well as to vandalize customer’s homes, extract sexual
favors from strapped customers and even, in one instance, force a
late payer to do involuntary labor.” Particularly infamous are so-
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called “couch payments,” or extracting sexual favors at the homes
of renters in lieu of repossession or cash payment. The Rent-A-
Center CEO
acknowledges that abuses such as couch payments occurred
in the past and “are probably going on today.” There are sim-
ply “more control problems” in a business where the activity
takes place out of the store, he says. But the company stresses
that such abuses are “few and far between” and not “in any
way condoned by Rent-A-Center.”
However, one reporter interviewed twenty-eight former store
managers of Rent-A-Center—six admitted the practice occurred
in their areas.64
Like payday lenders and pawnshops, rent-to-own operations
have grown quickly in the past two decades. Fortune Magazine re-
cently listed Rent-A-Center, the nation’s largest chain with 2,400
stores nationwide, as one of the 100 fastest growing companies in
the United States. In one year Rent-A-Center pulled in $1.7 bil-
lion dollars in revenue. Moreover, the highly profitable industry
has undergone substantial consolidation with Rent-A-Center and
the next largest chain, Rent-Way, owning more than half of the
market. Both of these companies roughly doubled in size in 1998
alone. Since 1982 the number of rent-to-own outlets nationwide
grew from around 2,000 to approximately 8,000 at the turn of the
century. Thus, our nation’s rent-to-own stores have quadrupled in
only twenty years.65
Car Titles and the “Repo-Man”
There are many different ways to use automobiles as collateral
for credit. The most obvious is borrowing the purchase price of a
new or used car. Traditionally, car buyers arrange their own fi-
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nancing through a bank or credit union. However, car dealers
often help buyers avoid the trouble of arranging their own financ-
ing by partnering with lenders to offer financing packages to ap-
proved customers. In the high-cost credit market, car dealers
catering to buyers with problematic credit histories often hold car
loans themselves, allowing them to repossess at will and then
quickly resell the car. These lenders draw customers in need of
transportation with promises such as “good credit, bad credit, no
problem,” “no credit check,” “no hassles,” “no money down,” and
perhaps more surreptitiously, “low introductory rate.”
Cars and trucks are also used to secure credit not related to the
purchase of the vehicle. Car title lenders or auto-pawnbrokers
loan money to cash seeking consumers who own their cars. Some
lenders require the borrower to turn over the car, which is then
stored on a fenced lot until repayment. But, the great majority of
non-purchase price auto lenders simply hold the car title—and a
copy of the keys. The latter strategy is more common because it al-
lows customers to borrow on what may be their only significant
asset without losing access to convenient transportation. Typi-
cally, car title loans contracts provide that the debtor relinquishes
ownership of the car upon a single missed payment.
There is a broad range of interest rates on high-cost car loans.
Mainstream bank or credit union car-purchase loans fluctuate in
the neighborhood of 10 percent APR, depending on the length of
the loan and whether the car is new or used. But borrowers with
problematic credit histories typically pay two or three times as
much. Average car title and auto-pawn loans cost between 200
percent and 300 percent APR, but can reach as high as 900 per-
cent.66 Like payday lenders, car title lenders use creative charades
to evade state interest-rate caps, where they exist. For example,
some companies claim they are buying cars from the customer and
then selling them back at a higher price. One journalist notes,
“[t]hey have trouble, however, explaining why the customer con-
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tinues to drive the car he just sold.”67 Moreover, like other high-
cost creditors, car lenders often use contracts with stiff penalties
for late payment, repossession, bounced checks, and more.
While interest rates tend to be less for car-secured credit than
unsecured credit, such as payday loans, interest rates alone often
do not represent the true price debtors pay. Some car title lenders
thrive less on the interest rates they charge than upon repossess-
ing cars. Jeanette Greco’s story is not unusual. When Greco’s hus-
band died his estate became tied up in court. The New Port
Richey, Florida woman needed cash to pay her son’s tuition, so she
decided to take out a title loan on the almost-new car her deceased
husband had given her as a present. The lender required Greco to
turn over the title to the $30,000 specially-ordered Dodge Stealth
in exchange for her $1,000 loan. After making faithful payments
on what turned out to be a 500 percent APR secured loan for sev-
eral months, Greco’s father suffered a heart attack in Puerto Rico.
Greco missed several of her weekly payments when she traveled to
Puerto Rico to take care of him. When she returned the car was
gone, along with all of the family Christmas presents she had been
storing in the trunk. While she never saw the Christmas presents
or her car again, court records indicate the car was sold at auction
for $3,500. The lender did not even rebate auction proceeds in ex-
cess of the Greco’s remaining debt. Despondent about her options,
Greco observed, “lawyers cost twice as much as what you pawned
the car for.”68
Title loan contracts often allow repossession after only one day
of arrears. Even in states which require the repossessing lenders to
rebate the excess value of the car beyond the outstanding debt,
lenders may quickly sell the car at less than its fair value rather
than find a buyer willing to pay a fair price for the car. Repossess-
ing creditors also have a strong financial incentive to “sell” the car
at less than its market value to a subsidiary holding company or to
an individual in a financial relationship with the lender. Cloaked
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by a nonexistent transaction, the creditor can claim no proceeds
are left over to rebate to the debtor, when in reality the creditor
keeps both full repayment of the loan and the collateral. In states
where there is no rebate requirement, or where the requirement is
not vigorously enforced, creditors simply resell repossessed cars at
fair market value and keep all of the proceeds. Many car title
lenders also have car dealer licenses. Regardless, some lenders loan
to title debtors who are likely to default, in order to find creative
ways to capture the value of the car.
Unsurprisingly, many car title debtors become desperate to
avoid repossession. Like all car owners, car title debtors use their
vehicles as transportation to and from their jobs, to drive their
children to school, or to visit sick family members. Many car title
debtors face unemployment if their car is repossessed. When
Debra Lusan, a working mother from St. Louis, fell behind on day-
care payments for her two children, she took out a $600 title loan.
After paying $900, she had long since lost track of how much the
title lender claimed she owed, but she still kept on paying. “I just
want to get my title back,” she explained.69 Many car title debtors
undergo privation, sacrificing food expenditures, utility payments,
and health care treatment, rather than lose access to transporta-
tion.
Another problem with high-cost automobile credit comes from
the rapid depreciation in the value of cars. When consumers pur-
chase new cars with reasonably priced financing, the car is likely
to provide reliable transportation long after the loan is repaid. But
where working-poor consumers buy used cars with high-priced
credit, the loan often outlives the car. Accidents and breakdowns
can make cars functionally worthless while the buyer still owes
thousands of dollars borrowed at high rates. Because few working-
poor families can manage two car payments, the buyer is left with-
out reliable personal transportation.
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Equity Predators: The Market for High-Cost Home and Mobile
Home Credit
The market for home loans has increasingly become the subject
of a widespread national debate over wealth inequality, racism,
and exploitation of the elderly. For most families, home ownership
is the key to long-term financial stability. Many commentators be-
lieve relative disparity in home ownership is essential to under-
standing contemporary American racial inequality. For example,
at the height of the 1990s growth economy, approximately 71 per-
cent of whites were homeowners compared to only 44 percent of
blacks.70 Moreover, a longstanding dispute exists over whether
mortgage lenders discriminate, either intentionally or uninten-
tionally, against minority loan applicants. Because homes are so
important and costly, most American families spend their lives at-
tempting to pay off home mortgages. The federal government has
provided valuable tax incentives and subsidies to encourage and
facilitate this process. State and local governments have also at-
tempted to aggressively regulate the market for home-secured
loans, often leading to conflict over which level of government is
the appropriate source of homeowner protection.
In the last five years this mortgage lending debate has focused
on the subprime market and particularly upon home-secured loans
consumer advocates describe as “predatory.” Lenders classify
debtors based on their credit histories into categories ranging from
“A” to “D.” Prime loans are those extended to customers with “A”
credit histories. The subprime market services borrowers with
“A–,” “B,” “C,” and even “D” credit histories. The government-
sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase most
prime mortgage loans from lenders who originate the loans. These
two companies either hold conventional prime loans themselves
or bundle and resell them as securities to Wall Street investors.
Although recently Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have began pur-
chasing some A– loans, in general, both have strict underwriting
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standards and pay similar prices for all the loans they purchase.
This, along with front-end competition for borrowers, stabilizes
the prices prime-market lenders charge. Subprime lenders, how-
ever, resell their loans to many different places and often will hold
and service the loans themselves. As an industry insider explains,
“[t]hat means subprime originators have much more leeway when
it comes to setting rates and underwriting standards. As a result,
rates, fees, and program guidelines vary drastically depending on
which broker or lender a consumer visits.”71
The boundaries between legitimate sub-prime loans and preda-
tory mortgages are difficult to draw. California-based Ameriquest
Mortgage Co., one of the nation’s leading subprime lenders, ex-
emplifies the conundrum. While Ameriquest has donated gener-
ously to consumer education funds and other charitable causes, its
credit record is perhaps even more checkered than its customers’.
In 1996 Ameriquest paid four million dollars to settle a lawsuit
brought by the Department of Justice which claimed its brokers
charged higher fees to women, seniors, and minorities than to
young white males. In 2000, the community activist group
ACORN filed a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission al-
leging the company consistently misleads its customers about the
true costs of interest rates and fees. Recently, company detractors
stormed an Ameriquest branch location. While employees hid in
a back office behind a locked door, the protestors marched around
chanting “people over profits” and “no more loan sharks.” To un-
derscore the point, one protestor wore a shark costume.72
Apologists argue these attacks are undeserved and point to
Ameriquest as a relatively progressive leader in the subprime mar-
ket. For instance, after the ACORN protests Ameriquest adopted
a ten-city pilot program which provides home ownership counsel-
ing to potential borrowers. The company would even counsel po-
tential customers to shop around for the best deal.73 But consumer
advocates remain skeptical. So too does Ward Adams from An-
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chorage, Alaska. Last year Adams, an out-of-work carpenter and a
veteran, fell behind on his bills and was looking for some way out.
Ameriquest offered to pay off his credit card debts if he would
agree to refinance his family home with them. Ameriquest mailed
all of the necessary documents, which Adams admits he did not
understand. An Ameriquest representative who claimed to have
lived in Anchorage for eighteen years “would call me up and we’d
[small talk] like he was my best friend over the phone. He was call-
ing me constantly, sometimes just to [chat].” Adams was ready to
sign the contract, but thought twice when he realized the repre-
sentative “didn’t know any of the crossroads or anything about
Anchorage.” Adams talked to some real estate friends and a non-
profit consumer debtor counseling service, both of whom admon-
ished him not to sign. The Ameriquest loan would have nearly
doubled the interest rate of Adams’ federally subsidized 7 percent
Veterans Administration loan. His mortgage payment would have
increased about $350 a month. “How am I going to pay that?
There would be no way,” Adams explained his shock, “It was
spooky.l.l.l. I was down to the wire—all I had to do was sign the
paperwork and send it back.”74
While Ward Adams may have narrowly avoided losing his
home, horror stories of those not so lucky have come to permeate
the nation’s newsprint media and policy rhetoric. For example, in
1990, 71-year-old Lula Mae Rosser owned the small Atlanta home
where she had lived for forty years. She agreed to a $12,500 loan
at 16.9 percent APR to finance the repair of her decaying roof.
Over the next decade the same lender, Better Homes Co., refi-
nanced the loan two additional times, eventually driving the
amount owed up to $30,000. A disabled former housekeeper,
Rosser lived on her $463-a-month social security income. After
the final refinancing, the monthly payments amounted to $365—
almost 80 percent of Rosser’s monthly income. Traditional prime
lenders avoid lending to families with income-to-payment ratios
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greater than 28 percent. Inexplicably, the loan application forms
incorrectly listed Rosser’s income at $664 per month. By January
of 2002, she had declared bankruptcy to at least temporarily pre-
vent Bank One, who had purchased the debt second hand from
Better Homes, from foreclosing on her only shelter.75
Although there is no bright line determining when a subprime
loan becomes a “predatory” loan, most agree the distinction turns
not only on contract terms but also on the borrower’s circum-
stances. A high interest rate loan might provide a young dual-in-
come family with a needed opportunity, but the same loan could
be a devastating financial blow to an elderly widow, such as Rosser,
with a fixed social security income. Still, there are many loans and
practices which almost all impartial observers agree are predatory.
Federal Reserve Board Governor Edward Gramlich has labeled as
“predatory” lending to borrowers who have no ability to repay the
debt, inducing a borrower to refinance a loan repeatedly, and con-
cealing the true nature of the contract from an unsuspecting or un-
sophisticated borrower. Other suspect practices include packing
loans with excessive single premium credit life insurance, negative
amortization, unnecessarily high balloon payments and prepay-
ment penalties, refinancing low-cost or subsidized home loans, in-
flated appraisal and credit report fees, yield spread premiums,
mandatory binding arbitration clauses, and marketing practices
targeted by race or age rather than credit history. What victims of
predatory lending do not understand until too late is that in a typ-
ical high-cost home loan transaction the interest rate is often a
relatively unimportant factor in the true price of the loan. The
heart of much criticism over high-cost home-secured lending is
that many lenders seek to capture home equity rather than a re-
turn on their investments.76
For instance, multiple refinances—or “flips”—offer high-cost
home lenders an unparalleled opportunity to strip homeowners of
home equity. At each new refinancing the lender collects another
TAM ING TH E SHARK S32
round of points and other miscellaneous closing charges, almost
always including a new credit insurance policy. When a borrower
falls behind on payments, many high-cost home lenders will use
the situation to flip the loan. The lender might explain, “we see
you have been late on your most recent payment. If you could use
some extra cash right now, why not refinance your loan and take
advantage of our temporary low introductory interest rate.” The
sales agent never mentions that refinancing triggers a prepayment
penalty and other charges costing thousands of dollars. Because
cash-strapped delinquent borrowers are eager to cooperate in order
to prevent additional late payment penalties or foreclosure pro-
ceedings, they are easy fodder for sales staff paid on commission.
Because these charges do not come out of the borrower’s pocket,
debtors often do not understand the true cost. Rather, the charges
are added on to the total amount the borrower owes on the home.
Or—put a different way—these charges are deducted from the eq-
uity the borrower has built up in the home over time. Predatory
lenders commonly include a small amount of cash as proceeds
from the new loan to help encourage borrowers to sign. The un-
suspecting but satisfied borrower walks away with a few hundred
dollars in his pocket and no idea he has just been taken for thou-
sands. After only a few flips, borrowers can loose a lifetime invest-
ment in home equity, never having realized the true consequences
of their contracts. A borrower may have spent hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars on the home, but when it comes time to sell—or
when foreclosure proceedings begin—the borrower owns nothing.
High-cost manufactured home credit poses special problems for
vulnerable debtors. Manufactured home loan interest rates are
generally two or three percentage points higher than conventional
home loans for borrowers with comparable credit histories. More-
over, the value of manufactured homes tends to depreciate, more
like an automobile than conventional housing. But unlike car
loans, which typically last no more than five years, manufactured
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home mortgages last fifteen, twenty, or even thirty years. Also,
manufactured home buyers tend to lease rather than buy plots for
their homes, leaving any appreciated value in the real estate itself
for the landlord. Soon after the contract is signed, many borrow-
ers find their manufactured home is worth nowhere near as much
as they owe. The homeowner becomes trapped not only in the
loan, but also within a manufactured home park. Because it typi-
cally costs around $7,500 to move a “mobile” home even a short
distance, park owners can dramatically increase plot rental fees or
require expensive lot improvement charges after a homeowner has
moved in. Manufactured homeowners have a median household
income of only $23,000 per year and an average age of 52.7 years.
Typically, they live check-to-check lifestyles, forcing them to ac-
cept monthly rent increases since they cannot afford the one-time
up front cost of moving their homes. Manufactured homeowners
may alternatively seek refinancing to relocate, subjecting them to
another round of points and probably a prepayment penalty, all of
which leave them even deeper in debt.77
Furthermore, recent investigations and studies have exposed
widespread fraud, inflated pricing, and a variety of other un-
scrupulous practices throughout the manufactured home finance
market. One study analyzed more than 400 manufactured home
consumer complaints filed with the Texas Attorney General. The
study found sales staff commonly falsify loan application informa-
tion in order to qualify eager buyers who cannot realistically afford
homes. Alternatively, many dealers will lend the borrower nearly
all of the down payment, which is then incorporated into the
home loan. These practices lead to high default rates. But, because
many lenders are affiliated with home manufacturers, they share
an interest in high sales volume as well as economies of scale in re-
possession proceedings. Moreover, if a debtor tries to assert her
rights in court, the lender may hamstring the borrower’s legal po-
sition by claiming the borrower committed fraud against the
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lender. These dealer practices drive responsible lenders out of the
manufactured home finance market and secondary market since
these lenders cannot accurately measure the quality of their in-
vestments. Moreover, because manufactured home buyers are usu-
ally locked into a contract before their home is delivered, dealers
have little incentive to carefully install the home—leading to sub-
standard housing. Many manufactured home buyers complain
their homes are never set up properly, lack specially ordered fea-
tures, or are even different models than those displayed by the
dealer. And, if a borrower refuses to accept the delivered home,
dealers sometimes retaliate by reporting or threatening to report
the borrower to credit bureaus. Many manufactured home lenders
and dealers conduct scrupulous businesses. But with approxi-
mately 8 percent of the United States population residing in
around 9 million manufactured homes, unfair manufactured home
lending is a surprisingly large and neglected problem.78
The market for subprime and manufactured home mortgages
grew rapidly in the 1990s. Federal Reserve Board researchers ex-
plain that between 1993 and 1998 “subprime and manufactured
home lenders’ share of conventional purchase mortgages extended
to lower income and minority borrowers tripled (quadrupled in
the case of Hispanic borrowers) .l.l. reaching levels of one-fifth to
one-third.” In the same five-year period the annual shipments of
manufactured homes grew about 47 percent, as compared to an-
nual increase of only 24 percent in conventional site-built homes.
While this increase is in part due to growing variety in manufac-
tured housing styles and amenities, it is also due to a growing pro-
portion of the American population groping for financial solutions
for lives on the edge of solvency. For instance, African Americans
are increasingly turning to manufactured homes instead of con-
ventional homes. Between 1993 and 1998 the proportion of
African Americans applying for home purchase mortgages from
manufactured home lenders rather than conventional home
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lenders more than doubled from 20 percent to 42 percent.79 No
data exists which casts light on the proportion of subprime and
manufactured home loans fairly considered predatory. However, if
interest rates and other credit charges do provide a fever chart of
economic health, recent trends both in the home mortgage mar-
ket as well as the market for other forms of high-cost credit suggest
a significant threat for many vulnerable Americans.
THE SYMPTOMS OF DEBT FEVER
High-cost debt can have a devastating impact on the lives of
debtors and their families. While the consumer credit industry in
general accounts for nearly 87 percent of debt listed in bankruptcy,
no reliable data estimates what proportion originates from alter-
native finance lenders.80 Generally the more disposable income is
spent on debt, the greater a household’s chances of bankruptcy
are. Therefore, it is not surprising that bankruptcy has grown in
step with increases in consumer debt.81 Bankruptcy is intended by
law as a last-resort method of discharging unpayable debts. It is
also intended to give debtors a fresh start to allow them to con-
tinue to function as productive members of society.82 However, a
great deal of stigma and moral judgment are attached to declaring
bankruptcy. It is the legal and moral equivalent of declaring one-
self a financial failure, and undoubtably shatters the self image of
many who take the option. As the nation’s leading bankruptcy
scholar explains, “everyone wants to be a success in the American
competition for prosperity; bankruptcy singles out those who did
not make it.l.l.l. We should be haunted by questions of why so
many Americans are losers in the great financial game of life.”83
Similarly, home foreclosures associated with high-cost mortgage
credit can tear families and communities apart. One congressional
representative persuasively explained, “[i]f owning a home is the
American dream, then the threat of losing that home is the Amer-
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ican nightmare.l.l.l. The human costs of mortgage is startling. A
family’s life savings and a major part of its earnings, understand-
ably, is often tied up in its home. For many, losing their home is an
event from which they will never recover.”84 Foreclosure uproots
the social links between people. Children are usually forced to
change schools. Commuting to and from places of employment
often becomes more challenging. New living arrangements are al-
most always less convenient, healthy, safe, and emotionally satis-
fying. Many families are forced to bounce from home to home of
families and friends until a new job or apartment can be found. Be-
cause home ownership defines “social personhood,” home foreclo-
sure destroys the self image and social embedding of families. In
the worst cases, new living arrangements are found only in a
homeless shelter, in a family car, or on the street.85 Statistics for
the causes and numbers of homelessness are notoriously difficult to
establish, but few see that problem as independent of home fore-
closure, and foreclosure is certainly not independent of high-cost
lending. What we do know is that increases in home foreclosure
have tracked the “explosive” growth of the high-cost lending mar-
ket. U.S. Census Bureau data shows that in the past twenty years,
the number of home foreclosures has increased by more than 384
percent—almost quadrupling—despite two decades of fast aggre-
gate economic growth.86
However, defaulting high-cost debtors do not always face events
that culminate in a single crisis point such as foreclosure or bank-
ruptcy. For many the collection process and worry over the im-
pending risk of these more cataclysmic events are the sources of
great suffering. One study asked debtors in default on mortgage
payments how they felt when they realized they had missed a pay-
ment and could not make it up. The nearly universal response was
shock and fear. Some of the typical answers were: “I panicked,
cried.” “We worry sick about it. It scares us to death.” “Well, it was
a shock .l.l. I went a bit berserk really.l.l.l.” “I felt ill, I remember
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the shock. I thought ‘where the hell are we going to find the
money from’?”87 These concerns are mirrored in dramatic increases
in the number of support and therapy groups dedicated to helping
those living in debt. For example, Debtors Anonymous, a support
and therapy system based on Alcoholics Anonymous, first ap-
peared in 1968 in New York. By 1998, twenty separate weekly
Debtors Anonymous meetings were listed in the Washington,
D.C. area alone. As the high-cost credit industry has exploded so
too has Debtors Anonymous, which now lists at least 500 therapy
groups in the United States, as well as additional groups in thir-
teen other countries.88
In high-cost lending, where default is dealt with as a matter of
course, the tactics used by creditors are often aggressive and the
stakes for debtors high. Often creditors use pressure collection
techniques which involve frequent calls, demand letters, threats,
manipulation, and intimidation. Moreover, federal legislation reg-
ulating debt collection has a relatively narrow scope, in addition
to enforcement problems. But its chief drawback is that it only
covers third-party debt collection agencies. This creates a signifi-
cant incentive for lenders to collect debts themselves rather than
selling the debt at a reduced price to secondhand collectors. Thus,
in the high-cost credit market, it is common practice to keep col-
lection activities “in house.” In an industry where profit revolves
around how much money can be collected, rather than predictions
of credit risk, the incentive to use high-pressure tactics, regardless
of the consequences for debtors’ personal lives, is difficult to con-
trol. Checks on abuse, either through government-sponsored rules
or the good intentions of well-meaning creditors, tend not to over-
come this incentive. A culture of disregard for debtors’ emotions
and suspicion of debtors’ motivations can gradually build up in
even well-meaning high-cost credit organizations.
High-cost creditors focus on pressuring customers into paying,
regardless of the consequences payment might bring. The Con-
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sumer Credit Collector, a monthly newsletter published for debt
collectors and often distributed by credit companies to their em-
ployees, reflects industry standards in the collection process. The
cover page article of one issue entitled: “Pressure As a Collection
Tool: Turn Up the Heat to Get Paid,” quotes a typical collector
who is having trouble “turning up the heat.” “My manager says I’m
too nice to our debtors and don’t know how to get tough when I
need to. Actually, I could become much more forceful in my col-
lecting, but I never know when the time is right.” The article goes
on to explain what “pressure” in the high-cost credit industry
means:
You must convince your customer that you have taken a per-
sonal interest in this account and that you won’t be satisfied
until the delinquency is remedied. Your customer must real-
ize that this balance is the most important account you have.
Once the debtor has accepted these two points, you have ap-
plied the necessary pressure that will enable you to get paid.89
No room is left for the possibility that debtors simply cannot pay.
The culture instead classifies any attempt by the debtor to take this
position as merely making “excuses.” Another article in the same
issue entitled, “Set Deadlines to Create Urgency,” is illustrative:
It is important for collectors to set deadlines when collecting.
Deadlines stress to debtors the urgency of the situation and
your seriousness in collecting the account. A deadline also
forces debtors to search for sources of repayment immediately
and not delay further.l.l.l. every conversation with a debtor
should include some type of deadline.90
The stresses associated with high-cost debt often lead to serious
emotional and psychological trauma. A whole range of depressive
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symptoms are part of the normal cycle for those in credit trouble,
including sleeplessness, anxiety, aggression, frequent crying, in-
creased alcohol intake, and weight loss. Moreover, “[d]efault
debtors blame themselves rather than society for the circum-
stances they find themselves in, and attribute these circumstances
to bad luck rather than any structural aspect of society.” In the
words of one debtor, “I feel I’ve let them [the creditors] down, I
feel guilty about that; my reliability is not there.” Even debtors
who do not blame themselves are still controlled by their fear that
others will make harsh judgements against them. Borrowers in
credit trouble rarely discuss their financial problems with others.
The senses of shame and embarrassment, combined with decreas-
ing financial ability to maintain a normal social life, cause debtors
to retreat into social isolation from both friends and family. This
retreat deprives them of normal means of emotional coping and
support that allow individuals to deal with life problems, thus
magnifying the emotional crisis.91 A debtor persuasively explains
in her own words:
[Collection Agents] talked to me as if I were a child, not let-
ting me speak. They didn’t speak about facts, only me as a
person—me as a bad person. One told me that people col-
lecting welfare paid them more monthly than I was offering
to pay. I was neither on welfare, collecting unemployment,
nor employed, but it made no impression on them. They
asked why I didn’t have a job, what had I been doing about
it. They insinuated that there was something definitely
wrong with me, and they wanted to know what it was. Shame
and hopelessness set in. They called a lot, never allowing
much peace between their verbal batterings. The collection
agency switched me from one representative to another, so
no history, rapport or empathy could develop. They were just
doing their job.
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There is no debtors prison but after a few of these relentless,
harassing phone calls I wished there were. Maybe then I
could escape the verbal and psychological abuse. I didn’t dis-
cuss the problems with my friends, because their disdain
would be too demoralizing. The fear, shame and pressure
from others, and especially myself, was paralyzing.
It was a nightmarish descent into debtor’s hell. I already
know I was a social misfit because I no longer had a credit
card, but now I had to experience degrading humiliation be-
cause I couldn’t pay my monthly minimum. So what could I
do? Commit suicide? Declare bankruptcy? Leave town and
change my name, leaving no forwarding phone number?l.l.l.
When I was younger and saw old newsreels of people jump-
ing to their death because of the 1929 stock market crash, I
couldn’t believe it. “Just for money?” I wondered. But now I
understand it.92
Many of the symptoms associated with debt trouble, including
anxiety, feelings of helplessness, aloneness, self-contempt, anger,
and terror, are also counted by medical, psychological, and legal
professionals as risk factors for suicide.93 Debtors have even been
know to sell their organs on the transplant black market to pay off
their debts. But in the high stakes collection of second-tier debts,
mortal danger does not come merely from debtors themselves. For
example, Henry James Hubbard III borrowed $300 from Georgia
Auto Pawn in Macon, Georgia. Although the loan was secured by
the title to Hubbard’s car, Georgia Auto Pawn nevertheless
charged interest and fees amounting to about 300 percent APR.
About five months later Mr. Hubbard fell behind on his payments.
When a collection agent came to repossess the car, Hubbard un-
derstandably protested. When both men drew guns, the collection
agent shot Hubbard three times while his wife looked on. In court,
a medical examiner testified that based upon the angle of Hub-
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bard’s wounds, he died from a bullet to the chest suffered while
lying on his back.94
THE DEBT FEVER IMMUNE SYSTEM: FREE MARKETS
While clearly horror stories such as Mr. Hubbard’s do not rep-
resent typical high-cost debtor experiences, hearing the tragic sto-
ries of high-cost debtors and observing recent credit trends, it is
easy to wonder what has gone wrong? These stories and data do
not easily cohere with the traditional liberal economic world view
which today permeates our policy-making, legal jurisprudence,
and economic theorizing. Rooted in the ideas of Adam Smith, Je-
remy Bentham, and other Enlightenment thinkers, the default
American explanation of market behavior leaves little room for
these relatively unclean stories of contemporary high-cost debt. In
our default worldview every individual, abstracted as homo eco-
nomicus—the economic man—makes self-interested decisions
which collectively create the best possible policy outcomes we can
reasonably expect. Adam Smith described the phenomenon of
self-interested individual decisions creating collective welfare as
“an invisible hand” guiding the allocation of resources to an opti-
mal outcome. Smith’s description lies at the heart of the Ameri-
can presumption against government interference in individual
market decision-making. Traditional economic reasoning suggests
free market forces should act as a sort of natural defense mecha-
nism, or immune system, against feverish credit prices.
This persuasive and elegant account of market decision-making
imbues the public relations, legal advocacy, and government lob-
bying of the high-cost credit industry. High-cost lenders rely on ar-
guments about the beneficial effects of their products, the
inevitability of a high-cost credit supply, and the patronizing mo-
tives of government regulation. For instance, subprime mortgage
lenders argue their home loans give low-income borrowers a
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chance to enter mainstream society which they would otherwise
never possess. To their credit, home ownership rates have shown
impressive gains despite the vast increase in home foreclosures.
Similarly, payday lenders explain their loans help families navigate
short-term financial crises. They insist it is arrogant for legislators
to presume they know which loans are in a borrower’s best inter-
ests better than the borrower herself. One North Carolina payday
lender persuasively explains:
“Thank you for being here,” “Thank God you were here for
me when I needed you.” These are very common quotes heard
in my lobbies. I’m sure it’s easy for you to sit in your office and
tell your readers how “bad” payday lenders are. We offer a
service, plain and simple.l.l.l. Our customers like our service.
If they didn’t, they wouldn’t use us, plain and simple.95
Indeed, who are legislators to tell a struggling mother she should
not borrow money to feed her children, pay her rent, or purchase
costly prescription medication? Lenders and their supporters ac-
cuse their detractors of clinging to archaic Puritan debt phobia to
the disadvantage of real people with real needs.
Many high-cost creditors and industry groups report favorable
customer satisfaction. High-cost creditors argue payday loan
rollovers, repeat pawning, widespread rent-to-own growth, and re-
iterate home and manufactured home refinancing are all evidence
of—not desperation-based borrowing—but contentment. In this
view, high-cost debtors, like all consumers, vote with their feet.
High-cost creditors merely respond by supplying legitimate serv-
ices to this natural demand. Moreover, high-cost lenders empha-
size that their customers often have no other credit choices.
Regulation which impedes this natural market function will only
dry up a necessary and beneficial market. If markets persist despite
the regulation, the costs of regulation are passed on to borrowers
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in increased prices which hurt consumers more than no regulation
at all. Lenders assert most consumers would prefer a lower price to
added regulatory protection. High-cost lenders argue their services
are inevitable, explaining that if government regulation shuts
down our current high-cost lenders, a black market will rise from
their ashes. Lenders argue the same services will be provided, but
consumers would pay an additional premium to insure illegal
lenders against the risk of getting caught. Moreover, an unregu-
lated black market would attract lenders specializing in corrup-
tion, fraud, and violence.
Much of the controversy over high-cost lending exists because
of our well-founded faith in the simple free market principles
which ground these compelling creditor arguments. To be sure,
free market competition, along with a strong democracy, has been
the backbone of American economic and political success in the
twentieth century. But as many economists, sociologists, political
scientists, journalists, judges, and legislators have recognized,
these market principles have not always produced for us the opti-
mal outcomes Adam Smith’s allegory of the invisible hand has led
us to hope for. This book attempts to reconcile traditional micro-
economic reasoning with an interest rate fever chart that suggests
many Americans are suffering. This book also examines the way
the state interacts with the high-cost credit market, hoping to dis-
till lessons which might help us better close the gap between our
traditional economic predictions and reality. This book hopes to
help us move towards a cure for our feverish high-cost credit mar-
ket.
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